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Abstract
Extreme events are one of the main channels through which climate and socio-
economic systems interact and it is likely that climate change will modify their
probability distributions. The long-term growth models used in climate change as-
sessments, however, cannot capture the effects of such short-term shocks. To inves-
tigate this issue, a non-equilibrium dynamic model (NEDyM) is used to assess the
macroeconomic consequences of extreme events. In the model, dynamic processes
multiply the extreme event direct costs by a factor 20. Half of this increase comes
from short-term processes, that long-term growth models cannot capture. The model
exhibits also a bifurcation in GDP losses: for a given distribution of extremes, there
is a value of the ability to fund reconstruction below which GDP losses increases
dramatically. This bifurcation may partly explain why some poor countries that
experience repeated natural disasters cannot develop. It also shows that changes
in the distribution of extremes may entail significant GDP losses and that climate
change may force a specific adaptation of the economic organization. These results
show that averaging short-term processes like extreme events over the yearly time
step of a long-term growth model can lead to inaccurately low assessments of the
climate change damages.
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1 Introduction
Modellers who assess economic impacts of climate change face a dilemma that
has been very frankly presented by William Nordhaus: “Along the economically
efficient emission path, the long-run global average temperature rises sharply.
After 500 years, it is projected to increase by 6.2
 
C over the 1900 global cli-
mate. While we have only the foggiest idea of what this would imply in terms
of ecological, economic, and social outcomes, it would make most thoughtful
people even economists nervous to induce such a large environmental change.
Given the potential for unintended and potentially disastrous consequences, it
would be sensible to consider alternative approaches to global warming poli-
cies.” (Nordhaus, 1997, p. 332). It is thus not only outsiders of mainstream
economics (e.g., Azar and Schneider, 2003) who question the legitimacy of
the very few per cent of GDP losses estimated by the published assessments
of climate change damages (e.g., Peck and Teisberg, 1992; Nordhaus, 1998;
Mendelsohn et al., 2000; Tol, 2002a,b), and the consequently unambitious op-
timal abatement trajectories prescribed by these studies.
Part of the problem comes from the fact that the quantification of impacts is
still in its infancy. The third assessment report of the IPCC (IPCC, 2001a)
highlights that many important sectors are not considered by published stud-
ies. Taking into account these neglected sectors may modify significantly the
assessment of the overall climate change damages. Also, most studies evalu-
ating optimal abatement trajectories envisage only certainty cases. Ambrosi
et al. (2003) showed, however, that inserting uncertainty about climate sen-
sitivity in stochastic optimal control models suffices to justify significant de-
partures from reference emissions trends, even if the most-likely damage level
remains moderate.
But another part of the problem may lie in the description of the law of
motion of the economic growth. Since resorting to long-term growth model
was made necessary by the time horizon to be analysed, the professional reflex
of economists was unsurprisingly to rely on extensions of the Solow model
(e.g., Nordhaus, 1994). These models, however, describe economies moving
along balanced pathways and readjusting easily to exogenous shocks. They
consequently neglect the fact that welfare losses resulting from a same amount
of climate change impact may be drastically different, would it fall on healthy
economies or on economies weakened by various disequilibria or experiencing
inertia in their readjustment process.
This paper aims at showing out the orders of magnitude at stake. It compares
economic consequences of a given climate impact falling on economies similar
in all respects except that one follows an equilibrated growth pathway while
the other experiences transient disequilibria. We take extreme events in Europe
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as an example because they are one of the most documented channels through
which climate and economy interact and because the order of magnitude of
this interaction is significant enough to support an aggregate analysis.
In a first section we present a model, NEDyM (Non-Equilibrium Dynamic
Model), whose asymptotic behaviour reproduces the Solow’s model, but which
allows for disequilibria during the transient processes. The second section ex-
plains how available information about large weather extreme events (including
uncertainty about their occurrence) is translated in economic terms. The third
section applies NEDyM and conducts comparative exercises.
2 A Dynamic Model to capture unbalanced growth pathways
NEDyM pictures a closed economy, with one representative consumer, one
producer, and one good, used both for consumption and investment 1 . This
very aggregate representation presents the drawbacks of the absence of sector-
based or geographical differentiation; but it has the advantage of being very
akin to the Solow model. This makes it easy to reproduce the ’after shock’
behaviour of a Solow model and to compare it with the behaviour of an econ-
omy with transition difficulties towards the same ’after shock’ equilibrium. We
thus ignore possible hysteresis effects in order to focus on the ’pure’ transition
mechanisms.
We explain below the main changes applied to the basic Solow model, starting
with its core set of equations where Y is production; K is productive capital;
L is labor; A is total productivity; C is consumption; S is consumer savings;
I is investment;Γinv is the investment (or, equivalently, saving) ratio; τdep is
the depreciation time; and Lfull is the labor at full-employment:
dK
dt
= I −
K
τdep
, (1)
Y = f(K,L) = ALλKµ , (2)
C + I = Y , (3)
1 A comprehensive description of NEDyM is available online. URL: www.centre-
cired.fr/forum/rubrique.php3?id rubrique=71
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L = Lfull , (4)
S = ΓinvY , (5)
I = S . (6)
NEDyM introduces the following changes to this generic structure:
(1) Goods markets : a goods inventory G is introduced, opening the possibility
of temporary imbalances between production and demand instead of a
market clearing at each point in time (Y = C + I, Eq. (3)):
dG
dt
= Y − (C + I) . (7)
This inventory 2 encompasses all sources of delay in the adjustment be-
tween supply and demand (including technical lags in producing, trans-
porting and distributing goods). The goods inventory situation affects
price movements:
dp
dt
= −p ·
(
α1price ·
Y − (C + I)
Y
+ α2price ·
G
Y
)
. (8)
Note that price adjustments operate but not-instantaneously: the equal-
ity of production and demand is verified only over the long term, and the
delay in price adjustments break this equality over the short term.
(2) Labor market : the producer sets the optimal labor demand Le that max-
imizes profits as a function of real wage and marginal labor productivity:
w
p
=
df
dL
(Le, K) . (9)
But full-employment is not guaranteed at each point in time such as
in Eq. (4) (L = Lfull), (i) because institutional and technical constraints
2 The good inventory can be either positive or negative. It should be interpreted
as the difference with an equilibrium value or, when divided by production, as
the opposite of a delivery lag. A positive value indicates temporary overproduction
and can be interpreted as the time necessary to sell the production. A negative
value indicates underproduction and can be interpreted as the time necessary for
a consumer to get the goods he or she ordered. Such formalism allows to account
also for services, which are a large part of the current economy and which cannot
be stocked.
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create a delay between a change in the optimal labor demand and the
corresponding change in the number of actually employed workers:
dL
dt
=
1
τempl
(Le − L) ; (10)
and (ii) because wages are rigid over the short-term. Indeed, wages
increases (resp. decreases) if labor demand is higher (resp. lower) than
the equilibrium level Lfull, restoring progressively the equilibrium level
of the employment rate:
dw
dt
=
w
τwage
(L− Lfull)
Lfull
. (11)
(3) Household behavior : such as in Solow (1956), NEDyM uses a constant
saving ratio but it sophisticates the arbitrage between consumption and
saving (S = ΓinvY , Eq. (5)) by considering that households (i) consume
C, (ii) make their savings available for investment through the savings S,
and (iii) hoard up a stock of money M .
(4) Producer behavior : instead of equating automatically investments and
savings (I = S, Eq. (6)) NEDyM describes an investment behavior “a` la
Kalecki (1937)” and introduces a stock of liquid assets hold by banks and
companies. This stock is filled by the difference between sales p(C + I)
and wages (wL) and by the savings received from consumers (S). These
liquid assets are used to redistribute share dividends 3 (Div) and to invest
(pI). This formulation creates a wedge between investment and savings.
dF
dt
= p(C + I)− wL + S −Div − pI . (12)
The dynamics of the system is governed by an investment ratio which
allocates these liquid assets between productive investments and share
dividends:
I = Γinv ·
1
p
· αF F . (13)
Div = (1− Γinv) · αF F . (14)
This ratio ensures that the redistributed dividends satisfy an exogenous
required return on equity ρ demanded by the shareholders. This describes
3 In this stylized model the share dividends represents all gains of investors: re-
distributed dividends, revenues from bonds, but also sales of assets, capital gains,
spin-offs to shareholders, repurchase of shares, payments in liquidation, payoffs re-
sulting from merger or acquisition, and awards in shareholders’ lawsuits.
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2001 EU-15
Symbol Description Steady state observed values
Y production (=demand) 9 8.8
L number of employed workers 93% 92.6 %
wL total annual wages 6 5.6
C consumption 7 6.8
S available savings 2 1.8
Div share dividends (i.e. all investor’s gains) 3 3.2
I physical investment 2 1.8
Table 1
NEDyM steady state (net flows) and EU-15 economic variables in 2001 according
to Eurostat (2002). Every value is in thousands of billions of euros.
a specific growth regime under which producers invest the amount of
funds available when the required amount of dividends have been paid 4 .
dΓinv
dt
=


αinv(γmax − Γinv) ·
(
Div
p·K
− ρ
)
if Div
p·K
− ρ > 0
αinv(Γinv − γmin) ·
(
Div
p·K
− ρ
)
if Div
p·K
− ρ ≤ 0
. (15)
2.1 Calibration and Dynamic properties of NEDyM
The model is calibrated so that the benchmark equilibrium is the economic
balance of the European Union in 2001(EU 15), assuming that the economy
was then on a steady state. Table 1 allows for comparing the value of this
steady state and the observed values from Eurostat (2002). Note that this
steady state is consistent with a Solow-like growth model with a constant
savings ratio set at Γ∗save = 22%.
2.1.1 Balanced growth and transient pathways
With a regular growth rate of productivity A of 2% per year, the model follows
a conventional pathway: production increases by 3% a year; and real wages
and real capital incomes grow regularly under full employment.
4 Of course, other economic regimes are possible, for example a regime in which the
priority is given to investments: in such a ”managerial economy”, producers redis-
tribute to shareholders the amount of funds available when all profitable investments
have been funded.
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Fig. 1. Model response to a 7% decrease in productivity, for NEDyM and the Solow
model. Over the long term, both models have the same final state.
To understand better of the model response to shocks, let us consider NEDyM
and its ’Solowian’ equivalent, both without productivity growth, and let us
compare how they react to a 10% instantaneous decrease of the productivity
coefficient A, starting from an identical equilibrium and, in the absence of
hysterisis, ending in the same steady state.
Figure 1, which displays the responses of both models, show that the transient
frictions are responsible for a stronger shock in NEDyM than in the Solow
model.
The underlying mechanism in NEDyM is as follows. Production decreases in-
stantaneously after the shock on productivity, and this decrease is amplified by
the fact that, because of price and wage rigidities, a lower labor productivity
leads to a lower employment rate. In parallel, the decrease of profits reduces
the re-invested share of savings. The resulting reduction in consumption and
investment lead to a Keynesian amplification of the initial shock. At the apex
of the crisis peak two years after the productivity shock, the unemployment is
3% higher than its equilibrium level. This unemployment disappears 10 years
after the shock as a result of the labor market adjustment, and is followed by
a slight overshoot due to inertia. In the Solow model instead, the wage adjust-
ment is assumed instantaneous, which explains the large difference between
the short-term responses of the two models.
The new steady state is reached about 50 years after the shock in NEDyM,
mainly because of the slow adjustment in the productive capital. This 50-year
characteristic time of the economy in NEDyM has to be compared with the
100-year characteristic time of the Solow model. This difference is due to the
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investment ratio adjustment, in response to price signals, which is possible in
NEDyM, unlike in the Solow model: in the present experiment, the investment
ratio decreases by 22%, and the overall physical investment by 30%.
If the productivity is decreased by the same 10%, but now progressively instead
of instantaneously, the NEDyM behavior gets closer from the Solow behavior
as the productivity decrease becomes slower. While an instantaneous decrease
in productivity yields, at the crisis peak, an underemployment increase of 3%
and an investment ratio decrease of 22%, a 20-year progressive decrease of the
productivity yields only an underemployment maximum increase of 0.5% and
an investment ratio decrease of 5%. If the productivity is decreased over 40
years, underemployment increases only by less than 0.2% and the investment
ratio by 3%. At the infinite limit, if the time scale of the productivity decrease
is much longer than the model time scales, there is no additional underem-
ployment nor changes in the investment ratio. In that latter case, NEDyM is
totally equivalent to the Solow model.
3 Modeling economic impacts of Large Weather Extreme Events
(LWEE)
There is no strict scientific definition of Large Weather Extreme Events (LWEE);
they are rather characterized by their media impact and their capacity to gen-
erate sudden and large social concerns 5 . We will however define them as rare
climate events causing important capital destructions over time periods rang-
ing from one day (cyclones) to several weeks (floods).
Lower media-impressive gradual changes (e.g. a progressive ill-adaptation of
infrastructure and housing Hallegatte (2005)) may ultimately be as important
channels of economic costs of global warming as extreme events. We concen-
trated however on the latter because they attract attention on the linkages
between short-run responses to shocks (capital destruction, break-out of es-
sential services like electricity or drinking water) and long-term dynamics.
Another reason is that they are both poorly represented in current integrated
assessment models (Goodess et al., 2003) and far more documented than other
types of climate impacts.
5 Examples of such events are the 2002 floods in Germany or the recent landfall of
Katrina in New-Orleans.
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3.1 Data on Costs of LWEE and Climate change predictions
Insurance and re-insurance companies register records of damages caused by
major weather catastrophes. According to Munich-Re (2003), their frequency
increased by a factor 4.4 between the 1960’s and the 1990’s and the corre-
sponding economic losses by a factor 7.9. This statistics reflects primarily a
better reporting of disasters and the location of more assets in vulnerable
places (e.g. costal areas). Assuming that the distribution of extremes did not
change significantly since the sixties (IPCC, 2001b, chp. 2), leads to a mul-
tiplication by 1.8 of the mean economic losses per event, corresponding to an
increase of 2% per year of the cost of the representative LWEE. This figure
is close to the economic growth rate over the period, suggesting that, even
though their frequency increases, the severity of each event is constant and
that its cost increases as the income level.
Obviously climate change is likely to modify significantly economic costs of
LWEEs. Even with no change of frequency and intensity of strong storms,
changes in their mean trajectory would suffice in causing higher damages by
impacting regions not currently adapted to them. There is also good reasons
why the meteorological conditions that are considered today as extremes will
be more frequent. Beniston (2004) show that the exceptional heat wave in
Europe in 2003 is a good proxy of the average summers in the latter part of the
21th century. This prediction is also supported by Fig. 2, from De´que´ (2004a).
Along the same line, De´que´ (2004b) predicts the number of days during which
the maximum daily temperature exceeds 30
 
C for at least 10 consecutive days
to be multiplied by about 20 in 2071-2100. This is in part caused by the higher
mean temperature but also by an increase of the temperature variability (up
to 100% in 2100) predicted by regional climate models (Scha¨r et al., 2004).
The same type of concerns exist about the occurrence of severe summertime
flooding in Europe (Christensen and Christensen, 2003).
This body of reasons explain why Choi and Fisher (2003) suggests that the
annual precipitation increase at the doubling CO2 concentration would in-
crease U.S. losses due to flooding by about 100% to 250% and losses due to
hurricanes by 150% to 300%. Dorland et al. (1999) found that a 6% increase
in the wind intensity could lead to a 500% increase in average annual damages
in Netherlands.
Without denying the interest of such insights we will not incorporate them in
our numerical exercise because such studies are still incomplete and because of
the difficulties to correlate changes in the characteristics of LWEE weather and
their consequences. Since our objective is not an in depth discussion of how
changes in frequency, intensity and unitary damages of natural phenomena
will affect their direct costs, we will assume that existing data provide orders
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Fig. 2. Observed summer mean temperature (in
 
C) over France from 1960 to 2003
(crosses), and the corresponding prediction from ARPEGE-Climat up to 2100 (dia-
monds). According to this model, the extreme heatwave over France in 2003 becomes
usual from 2070. Figure by Michel De´que´, from De´que´ (2004a).
of magnitude meaningful enough for the objectives of this paper.
3.2 Definition of LWEE in numerical experiments
We focus here below on four types of LWEE: floods, winter storms (and the
corresponding storm surges), droughts and heat waves. Following Katz et al.
(2002), we characterize them through three criteria: (i) a minimum thresh-
old for the magnitude of economic losses, (ii) the occurrence probability of a
LWEE exceeding this threshold over a period of one month; (iii) the proba-
bility density function of the losses due to one LWEE.
3.2.1 Level of the threshold
According to Munich-Re (2004) or Swiss-Re (2004), floods in Germany caused
in 2002 direct damages 6 amounting to 10 G

, spread out between infrastruc-
tures(4 G

), trade & industry (2 G

), household (2 G

) and others (2 G

).
According to the same source, the Mississippi floods in 1993 in the US caused
18 G

losses and the winter’99 windstorms over Europe around 20 G

losses
(Munich-Re, 2002). Swiss-Re (1998) shows that Netherlands exhibits a 30 to
60 billions US

flood damage potential and a 100 billions US

damage poten-
tial in case of storm surge. The flash-floods in the south of France are at the
other end of the spectrum of events that are considered as catastrophic with
a typical cost around 1 G

per event(e.g. Nimes, 1999). Given these orders of
6 All these figures represent only direct losses.
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magnitude we set the minimum threshold for an LWEEs at 0.01% of the GDP
of the EU 15, which corresponds to damages amounting to 0.80 G

.
3.2.2 Probability of occurence
Taking the last 20 years as representative of the statistical distribution of
climate events and assuming that their distribution was stationary during this
period and that they are independent, the probability of occurrence over one
month of a weather event causing more than 0.800 G

of losses is pEE = 0.06
according to the Munich Re data. For simplicity sake, we assume that there is
at most one LWEE in one month, even though examples exists of the contrary
(e.g. the two winter-storms in Europe in December 1999).
3.2.3 Probability density function
There are evidences that LWEE natural intensity probability exhibits a power
tail (Katz et al. (2002)). The link between LWEE natural intensity and the
corresponding economic losses, however, is still a very open question. No direct
relationship can be established for several reasons: (i) losses do not increase
regularly with respect with natural intensity but involve thresholds, one of
which being the maximum economic loss potential of each impacted area,
that cannot be exceeded even though LWEE natural intensity increases 7 ; (ii)
progressive adaptation measures will reduce the LWEE costs as their frequency
or intensity augments.
A power tail of the losses pdf is, however, consistent with what appears in
Figure 3, that shows the probability density of single-LWEE economic losses,
ranked in four categories based on Munich-Re’s assessments.
Therefore, to work with a tractable function, we will assume in the following
that the probability density function (pdf) tail of the LWEE economic losses
follows a Weibull distribution and is given by (for s > sEE).
fβ,χ(s) = β · χ
β · (s− sEE)
β−1 · exp
(
−
(
χ(s− sEE)
β
))
(16)
The fit gives χ = 0.897933333 and β = 0.000178672, and the corresponding
Weibull distribution is reproduced in Fig. 3. This function fits to existing
statistics reasonably enough for our exercise 8 .
7 An evaluation of such potential of losses for some extreme events and some regions
is proposed by Swiss-Re (1998)
8 To assess the sensitivity of our results to changes in the distribution function, we
also tested a linear fit (see below).
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Fig. 3. Histogram of weather event probability with respect to its economic losses, in
4 ranges, for the observations (Obs) and the fitted Weibull distribution fζ (Weibull).
3.3 Modelling costs of capital losses
Disasters mainly destroy the stock of productive capital and a natural mod-
elling option to represent their consequences is to consider that they reduce
instantaneously the total productive capital (K −→ K − ∆K). This option
amounts to treat an after-disaster economy as equivalent to an economy in
which past investments would have been lower. Such a modelling, hereafter
referred to as H1, would however introduce three biases for impact assessment:
(1) it amounts to consider that only the less efficient capital is destroyed by
a disaster; (2) it does not distinguish between productive investments and re-
construction investments; and (3) it does not take into account the constraints
that slow down the reconstruction process. We will now discuss these biases
and propose modelling solution to avoid them.
(1) Since most production functions exhibit decreasing returns, considering
an after-disaster economy as equivalent to an economy in which past
investments would have been lower amounts to consider that capital de-
struction would affect only the less efficient capital. Indeed, in a Cobb-
Douglas function (Y = f(K,L) = ALλKµ) the “after LWEE” production
would be Y1 = f(L,K0−∆K), and a x% loss of equipments would reduce
the production by less than x% (see Fig. 4).
To account for the fact that LWEEs may affect whatever capital stock,
we modified the Cobb-Douglas production function, by introducing a
term ξK , which is the proportion of non-destroyed capital. The variable
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Fig. 4. Production with respect to production capital for different hypotheses.
ξK is such that the effective capital is K = ξK · K0, where K0 is the
potential productive capital in absence of LWEE, and the new production
function is 9 :
Y2 = ξK · f(L,K0) = ξK · A · L
λ ·Kµ0 (19)
This new production function is such that a x% destruction of the
productive capital reduces production by x% (see dashed-line in Fig. 4).
The replacement of the productive capital K by the two new variables K0
and ξK makes now necessary to modify the investment modelling, which
leads us to the second bias we mentioned.
(2) In our first modelling, there was no distinction between the investments
devoted to increase capital stocks and the reconstruction investments, in
9 We rewrite the Cobb-Douglas production function as:
Y = f(L, K0) =
K0∫
0
∂2f(L, k) · dk , (17)
where ∂2f is the derivative of f with respect to the productive capital. To describe a
situation where equipments are equally affected independently of their productivity,
we adopted the following specification:
Y =
K0∫
0
∂2f(L, k) · ξK · dk = ξKf(L, K0) = ξK ·A · L
λ ·Kµ
0
(18)
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spite of their difference in nature 10 . Denoting now In the investments that
increase the potential capital K0, and Ir the reconstruction investments
that increase ξK , we can write:
dK
dt
= Ir +
(
In −
1
τdep
·K
)
=
dξK
dt
·K0 + ξK ·
dK0
dt
, (20)
which leads to:
∂K0
∂t
=
−1
τdep
K0 +
In
ξK
(21)
∂ξK
∂t
=
Ir
K0
(22)
Assuming that, when ξK < 1, investments are all first devoted to re-
place the destroyed capital because they have higher returns leads to:
Ir =


Min(I, (1− ξK) ·K0) if ξK < 1
0 if ξK = 1
(23)
We can then easily derive In from :
In = I − Ir (24)
This hypothesis will be hereafter referred to as H2.
(3) Considering the small amount of capital destroyed by past LWEEs com-
pared with annual investments, this modelling of the post-disaster re-
construction would lead to a very rapid recovery from any event. But
past experience suggests that some constraints reduce the reconstruction
pace. For example, the 10 G

of reconstruction expenditures after the
2002 floods in Germany have been spread over more than 3 years, even
if 10G

is small compared with the total annual investment in Germany.
One first source of friction is that insurance and re-insurance companies or
public organizations need some time to direct high amount of money at re-
pairing works. This constraint is crucial in developing economies (Benson
and Clay, 2004). Another source of friction is that the sectors involved in
reconstruction activities have skills and organizational capacities adapted
to the normal state of affairs and cannot face huge increases in demand
(after the French winter-storms in 1999 or after the AZF explosion in
Toulouse, roofers were not numerous enough and the reconstruction took
several years).
To capture how these constraints may impact significantly the transi-
tion pathways back to the equilibrium, we bounded by fmax the fraction
10 This distinction has been introduced by Albala-Bertrand (1993).
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of total investment that reconstruction investments can mobilize. This
last specification will be referred to as H3.


In = I − Ir
Ir =


Min(fmax · I, (1− ξK) ·K0) if ξK < 1
0 if ξK = 1
(25)
A value fmax = 10 % means that the economy can mobilize about 2%
of the GDP per year for the reconstruction i.e. about 180 G

per year
for EU-15. This order of magnitude can be compared with other efforts
diverting investments from productive activities such as the 1.2% of US
GDP spent yearly for the Vietnam war and the 0.5% for the 1990-1991
war in Irak. Two per cent of GDP for a specific reconstruction activity
thus represents a significant effort.
3.3.1 Calibration and sensitivity analysis
To validate these modelling options, a disaster is applied on the economy at
steady state in NEDyM with the different hypotheses summarized in Tab.2.
This disaster destroys the stock of productive capital for an amount equiva-
lent to 3% of GDP, or 0.75% of the productive capital stock. This amount is
chosen because it is comparable (in relative terms) with the 1999 Marmara
earthquake, the consequences of which are large and have been well described,
see for example World Bank (1999) or OECD (2003). According to these
sources, this earthquake destroyed productive capital amounting for between
1.5 and 3.3% of GDP.
Figure 5 shows the economic responses to a disaster under the modelling
frameworks H1, H2 and H3 with different values of fmax: 20%, 10%, 5%, 1%.
It shows first that the maximum intensity of the shock is multiplied by 2 in H2
compared with H1, and by 2 again in all H3 cases compared with H2. Second,
the duration of the production losses and unemployment period spans from a
few month in H1 to several years in H3 with fmax = 1%. Third, there is a
significant increase in the employment rate during the rebuilding phase in all
hypotheses even though a small production loss remains.
As to the annual growth rate (Fig. 6), it is reduced by 0.2% the year of the
disaster in H1 and H2, and by between 0.45 and 0.8% in H3. The next year,
it is still reduced only in H3 with a constraints as tight as fmax = 1% but it is
higher than the baseline in all the other simulations because of the catching-
up effect and the boosting through reconstruction works. These effects then
vanish progressively the following years.
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Hypothesis Description
H1 Cobb-Douglas production function
No distinction between productive investments and reconstruction investments
H2 Modified Cobb-Douglas production function
Distinction between productive investments and reconstruction investments
No limitation of the reconstruction investments
H3 Modified Cobb-Douglas production function
Distinction between productive investments and reconstruction investments
Limitation of the reconstruction investments at fmax % of the total investments
Table 2
Summary of the different hypotheses on disaster modelling.
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Fig. 5. Production and employment rate pathways, in response to a disaster de-
stroying capital amounting for 3% of GDP, in the classical hypothesis H1 (only the
less efficient capital disappears), H2 (capital disappear equally with respect to its
efficiency) and H3 (reconstruction investments are limited).
The model response which is the most consistent with observation is produced
using the H3 hypothesis and fmax = 10%. In particular, the model reproduces
the two-year reconstruction duration and the growth rate reduction the year of
the disaster. Indeed, according to the World Bank: “In terms of indirect costs,
the Bank team estimates that the earthquake will reduce GNP in 1999 by 0.6
percent-1.0 percent. [...] In the year 2000, GNP growth is expected to exceed
baseline forecasts by some 1 percent of GNP due primarily to reconstruction
activity.” 11 . These estimates are roughly consistent with the 0.65% GDP
11 These figures are confirmed by estimates from the OECD or by the Turkish
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Fig. 6. Changes in economic growth due to the disaster, year per year, for the
different hypotheses.
reduction found by the model in the H3-10% hypothesis.
The 0.3% production increase found by the model during the next year seems
underestimated. Three reasons can be proposed. First, it has been suggested
(e.g, OECD, 2003) that the replacement of the old destroyed capital by more
recent capital would increase the productivity after the disaster. Considering
the situation in the immediate aftermath of the earthquake, it seems however
very unlikely that the Turkish industries could afford at that time to conduct a
technical improvement of their production techniques. Second, the government
and international trade, which are so far not modeled in NEDyM, can help to
increase the investment ratio. Third, it is difficult to disentangle the effect of
the shock and the underlying economic evolution. For example, the Turkish
GDP decreased by 7% the year preceding the Marmara earthquake. Taking
into account the underlying economic situation would require to apply the
shock on an unbalanced economy. These issues will be investigated in following
papers.
These results show that NEDyM is able to qualitatively reproduce the macro-
economic consequences of a large disaster, for a carefully selected value of fmax.
It is, however, difficult to validate it more rigorously, because the impact of a
disaster on the national account aggregates (like annual GDP) are generally
much smaller than the underlying economic variability (e.g. Albala-Bertrand
(1993)).
Industrialists and Businessmen Association (TUSIAD) (see OECD (2003)).
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Cost assessment model Mean GDP losses due to LWEEs
Averaged direct cost
180 millions euros
0.002 % of GDP
Solow-like growth model 2 billions euros
assessment 0.02 % of GDP
NEDyM assessment
4.5 billions euros
0.05 % of GDP
Table 3
Mean costs of LWEEs : averaged direct costs; GDP losses with a Solow-like model;
GDP losses with a NEDyM assessment
4 The macroeconomic costs of LWEEs
We conduct in this section numerical experiments to a better understand how
the assessment of climate change impacts could be sensitive to assumptions
upon the very functioning of the growth engine of the impacted economy.
We do so under assumptions of stable LWEE distribution in a first step and
under changing distributions in a second step. This forces to encompass a 200
years time period because we need a representative set of very rare LWEEs.
Obviously, the aim of is not to reproduce a realistic economic trajectory over
such a long period but rather to provide an assessment of the macroeconomic
costs of the current LWEE distribution and to compare its magnitude with
observations.
4.1 Macroeconomic costs due to the current LWEE distribution
The LWEE distribution calibrated in section 3.2.3 is used to generate a set of
LWEEs. NEDyM finds an annual mean direct cost of about 0.002% of GDP
(i.e. 180 millions euros per year at present GDP). This negligible direct cost
causes a far more significant GDP loss of 0.02% in a Solow-like model and a
0.05
Moreover, NEDyM can capture the magnitude of this adjustment process: the
largest shocks reaches 0.15% of production decrease over a few years. There-
fore, taking into account short-term adjustments modifies damage assessments
in two ways: first, the mean GDP loss is larger; second, significant short-term
shocks overlie this mean GDP losses.
Beyond the cost-multiplying effect of transitions, costs may be found higher
by considering spatial aggregation issues. If we assume indeed that there is
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Fig. 7. Production change due to the current LWEE distribution for the EU.
no perfect damage cost-sharing over Europe, and if we consider a country
representing 10% of the European area, this country will suffer less frequent
LWEEs. But, for an unchanged natural intensity of the events, damages due
to one event will represent a larger part of the country GDP. In this case,
the consequences of one event can be significantly larger: just after the shock,
production can be reduced by more than 0.5%, and the shock can last up to
one decade.
This suggests that risk sharing helps to cope with LWEEs, as most of the
adverse effects on welfare occur during the few years following each LWEE.
Risk sharing increases the frequency but decreases the relative intensity of
the events, leading to approximately the same mean production losses, but
smoothing the shocks and their effects on welfare.
4.2 Economic vulnerability to changes in the LWEE distribution
Let us now examine the hypothesis under which climate change might raise
significantly the costs of the LWEEs either because their frequency or inten-
sity increases or because of changes in the localization of physical assets and
populations.
To do so we carry out a sensitivity analysis modifying:
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Fig. 8. Mean GDP losses due to LWEEs after 100 years, in percent of GDP, with
respect to the value of fmax (in %) and to the value of the LWEE parameters
(αp = αz, in %). The red line separates the parameters for which the GDP losses
are below 1% of GDP.
• The extreme event probability which is multiplied by αp
pEE = αp · p
0
EE , (26)
• The pdf of the losses, such that mean loss is multiplied by αz:
f(s) = β · χβ ·
(
s− sEE
αz
)β−1
· exp
(
−
(
χ
(
s− sEE
αz
)β))
. (27)
For simplicity sake the frequency and the mean cost of the LWEEs are both
multiplied by the same amount (αp = αz) for the six values {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6}.
Moreover, since the GDP losses depend strongly on fmax and given that this
ratio may change in the future and that poor countries may have far lower
reconstruction capabilities as those captured by our 10% upper limit assump-
tion (Benson and Clay, 2004), we carried out simulations with ten values of
fmax, ranging from 1% to 10%.
Figure 8 represents the averaged annual production loss due to LWEEs after
100 years with respect to the value of fmax and to the value of αp and αz.
The interesting finding is the existence of a threshold line: for each value of
fmax, LWEE damages remain limited if αp and αz are lower than a certain
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value, beyond which production losses increase rapidly. The red line in Fig. 8
shows, for each value of αp and αz, the minimum value of fmax that maintains
the GDP losses below 1% of GDP.
These results show that the fact that the macroeconomic consequences of one
event are in most cases small (Albala-Bertrand, 1993) does not mean that a
distribution of events cannot have long-term consequences, especially on poor
countries. The fact that extreme events and constraints on reconstruction ca-
pabilities can be strong obstacles to economic development has already been
stressed by Gilbert and Kreimer (1999) or Benson and Clay (2004). Accord-
ing to our results, this effect may even contribute to their bifurcation towards
poverty traps: because they face regular extreme events and because they do
not have the financial capacity to rebuild quickly enough their infrastructures
after each shock, they cannot accumulate productive capital. As an example,
Guatemala adds to its social unrest an impressive series of weather catas-
trophes 12 that prevent any development. In the same region, the Honduran
prime minister said, the single hurricane Michele in 2001 ”put the country’s
economic development back 20 years” (IFRCRCS (2002)).
But more generally, our results highlight that economic vulnerability is due to
the interplay of a given intensity of impacts and of an economic and technolog-
ical mobilisation capacity. As a consequence, one cannot assess the potential
damages due to climate change without specific hypotheses on the economic
organization of the future societies. For instance, a rise in extreme event costs
because of climate change, could lead to high damages, unless a specific adap-
tation of the economic organization is implemented, allowing for a quicker
reconstruction after each extreme event. This specific adaptation could be for
instance changes in the reinsurance regulation (e.g. the Solvency package of
the EU that aims at increasing the solvency margins of the insurance sector)
or the creation of specific funds (e.g. the Florida Hurricane Catastrophe Fund
or the French Cat-Nat system), and can be modeled in NEDyM through an
increase in fmax.
5 Conclusions
1.confirm the intuition : equilibrium models are unable to assess climate costs.
2.we have developed an analytical tool
3.substantive conclusions are bifurcation
12 The hurricane Mitch in 1998, 3 years of drought from 1999 to 2001, and the
hurricane Michele in 2001
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1.poverty traps 2.climate change et outils assurantiels
This article presents the non-equilibrium dynamic model NEDyM. NEDyM is
demonstrated to be equivalent to the neoclassical Solow growth model over the
long-term, when parameters are evolving slowly with respect to the adjustment
delays.
To be able to capture the consequences of disasters like extreme events, a
capital destruction modeling is proposed. This modeling takes into account a
realistic limitation of the short-term maximal amount spent in reconstruction
activities, due to financial and technical constraints. This modeling allows for
a better representation of the macro-economic consequences of disasters, as
shown by a validation against the 1999 Marmara earthquake in Turkey.
An assessment of the costs of extreme events is then carried out. It shows
that dynamic processes multiply the extreme event instantaneous costs by
a factor 20. The short-term processes alone are responsible for 50% of this
cost amplification. This highlights how important it is to capture short-term
processes to assess the long-term damages due to extreme events.
The GDP losses due to extreme events depend, with strong non-linearity,
both on the distribution of extremes and on the ability to fund the recon-
struction after each disaster. For a given distribution of extremes, there is a
bifurcation value of the ability to fund reconstruction: beyond this value, GDP
losses are low; below this bifurcation value, GDP losses increase dramatically.
This illustrates the deep difference between considering one single event or a
distribution of events: a series of almost negligible extreme events can have
significant consequences at the macroeconomic level. This result may partly
explain the lack of development of poor countries that experience repeated
natural catastrophes without large funding capacity.
The model also shows that future changes in the distribution of extremes
may entail significant GDP losses and that climate change may force a spe-
cific adaptation of the economic organization. These results illustrate that the
economic assessment of climate change does not depend only on beliefs on cli-
mate change, but also strongly on beliefs on the current and future economic
organization.
Finally, these results suggest that climate change damages might be more
related to the intensity of shocks (like extreme events) than to the evolu-
tion of the mean productivity. After the first enumerative studies of climate
change impacts (e.g. Nordhaus (1991), Cline (1992), Mendelsohn and Neu-
mann (1999)), it has been argued that it was necessary to account for long-
term economic dynamics (by Tol (1996) or Fankhauser and Tol (2005)). This
article suggests that it is also absolutely necessary to account for short-term
dynamics and for the consequences of shocks like extreme events: further work
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on short-term/long-term interactions in economics, and particularly the ac-
counting for business cycles, is needed in order to produce confident assess-
ments of climate change impacts.
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